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Listings from the Emerging Economies: An Opportunity for Reputable Stock Exchanges

Abstract
We provide current evidence to show that the numbers of sponsored depositary receipts
created and cross‐listed have increased by more than two‐fold over the last decade and a substantial
proportion of this growth came from the emerging and developing economies. We argue that the needs
of this clientele and the inadequacies of existing legal and financial system create an opportunity for
reputable stock exchanges to play the role of an information and reputation intermediary and in so
doing allow exchanges to leverage on their reputation capital to compete more effectively for the
growing business from the emerging and developing economies. We contribute further by developing a
parsimonious model to analyze the interaction between an exchange playing the new role and firms
seeking to list their equity on the exchange. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained
and provide an explanation for the spike in delisting in the latter half of 2007. Our model fills an
important gap by addressing some shortcomings in existing theoretical models.
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Listings from the Emerging Economies: An Opportunity for Reputable Stock Exchanges

1. Introduction
There has been an unprecedented growth in the number of sponsored depositary receipts (SDRs)
and cross‐listings over the last two decades. This explosive growth has attracted the attention of
academics and spawned numerous studies that seek to explain why firms would list their shares on
overseas exchanges and measure the share price reactions to such listing decisions. Firms opt to list on
overseas exchanges for various reasons but ultimately the decision to cross‐list hinges on whether the
benefits derived from cross‐listings outweigh the costs. The conventional wisdom, which is the focus of
earlier studies through the 1990s (Errunza and Losq, 1985; Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan, 1987, ;
Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991; Foerster and Karolyi, 1993, 1998, 1999; Howe, Madura and Tucker, 1994;
Lau, Diltz and Apilado, 1994; and Miller, 1999 among others), is that listing on overseas exchanges help
to overcome barriers to cross‐borders investment and bring about benefits such as lower cost of capital,
greater liquidity in the trading of the shares, and prestige and better visibility for the listing firms.
But Stulz (1999) observes that the conventional wisdom at that time cannot adequately explain the
documented decline in the cost of capital associated with the cross‐listing of firms from the emerging
economies2. The decline in cost of capital is much lower than predicted by theory. Stulz argues that the
impact of globalization on the cost of capital is likely attenuated by home bias which is a manifestation
of the information asymmetry problem and ultimately a product of the poor corporate governance of
firms from the emerging economies (see Stulz, Pinkowitz, and Williamson, 2003). Stulz’s critiques and
suggestions lead to a series of new studies3 (Coffee, 2002; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doige, Karolyi and
Stulz, 2004; Doidge 2004a, 2004b; and Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller and Stulz, 2005; Bianconi and Tan,
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For ease of exposition, we will use the term “emerging” economies to refer to “emerging and developing”
economies.
3
Karolyi (2006) provides an excellent review of this and earlier literature.
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2010 among others) that look beyond the conventional wisdom and into how the legal environment and
corporate governance structure affects the costs and benefits of cross‐listing4. Our paper is a
contribution in this direction. We are interested in exploring how a reputable stock exchange like the
New York Stock Exchange can help to mitigate the information asymmetry problem and how the
exchange can strategically position to compete more effectively for the growing listing business from
the emerging economies.
We will provide current evidence to establish the fact that the listing business from the emerging
economies has grown by more than two‐fold over the recent decade and this growth will likely continue.
This trend presents the stock exchange industry with significant business opportunities and creates an
opportunity for reputable exchanges to play a new role, that of an information and reputation
intermediary. We will argue that the regulatory bodies, investment banks, rating agencies, and financial
analysts cannot fully address the information asymmetry problem faced by firms from the emerging
economies, so there is room for reputable stock exchanges to play the role of an information and
reputation intermediary. Since this new role leverage on the exchange’s reputational capital, reputable
exchanges will be able to compete more effectively for the growing listing business from the emerging
economies.
Furthermore, we add to the theoretical literature by developing a parsimonious model to analyze
the dynamic interaction between an exchange playing the new strategic role and firms deliberating
whether or not to cross‐list on the exchange. Our model is closely related to Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz
(2004) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006)5. Our aim is to develop a simple enough model to address
the shortcomings in the models developed in these two papers and to account for observed empirical
evidence. Unlike Doidge et al (2004) which take the exchange’s listing requirement as exogenous, we
4

One related study outside the cross‐listing literature is Kuipers, Miller and Patel (2009) which explore how the
legal environment affects valuation in cross‐border takeovers.
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investigate the equilibrium that emerges as a result of the dynamic interaction between the decisions of
an exchange and a listing firm where both are striving to maximize their value. Hence our model is able
to shed light on the decision of the exchange as well as the decision of a foreign firm that is
contemplating whether to list or delist from the exchange. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) is an
ambitious attempt to address a multitude of questions related to competition in the exchange industry.
Although Chemmnaur and Fulghieri also investigate the interaction between reputation and listing
standards, there are two shortcomings in their reputation model. First, they model the effect of
reputation by assuming the presence of a "Standard Maximizing" exchange that is not concerned with
maximizing value. Second, they ignore the compliance costs6 that listing firms will have to incur if they
choose to list on an exchange. This is an important consideration for listing firms since there is a tension
between the potential of gaining value from listing on a high quality exchange and the incurrence of
higher compliance costs imposed by a high quality exchange. Both assumptions in Chemmanur and
Fulghieri are unrealistic. We endogenized the effect of reputation in the payoff function for the
exchange and incorporate the compliance costs in the payoff function for the listing firms. Thus, our
model fills an important gap in the theoretical literature.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide recent evidence on the growth trend in
SDRs and listings of SDRs. In Section 3, we make a case for the new strategic role that a reputable
exchange can play to compete more effectively for the growing clientele from the emerging economies.
Section 4 develops our theoretical model and Section 5 discusses our solution. Section 6 concludes.

2. Growth Trend in Sponsored Depositary Receipts and Cross‐listings
Table 1 summarizes the growth in the number of SDRs and the number of cross‐listed SDRs from
1970 to 2010. The data is a count of the newly created SDRs and cross‐listed SDRs in each of the three
periods: 1970‐1989, 1990‐1999 and 2000‐2010. This data, which includes SDRs from all the major
6
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depositary banks such as Bank of New York Mellon, Citibank, Deutsche bank, J. P. Morgan Chase and
Computershare Trust, was downloaded from the Bank of New York Mellon’s depositary directory7 on
May 11, 2010. Accordingly, the data for 2010 covers only the first four plus months for 2010. Table 1
focuses only on the three geographic regions that contribute the most numbers of SDRs and cross
listings. The three regions are Asia, Europe and Latin America. To shed light on what proportion of the
growth arises from the emerging and developing economies, we further segregate the data for Asia and
Europe into companies from advanced and non‐advanced economies as defined by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF)8. In the case of Latin America, none of the countries in the dataset are classified
as an advanced economy by the IMF. A list of countries from Asia and Europe that are classified as
advanced economies by the IMF is provided in Table 2.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
There are several noteworthy patterns in Table 1. The total number of SDRs created and cross‐listed
in the last ten years alone more than doubled the total number of SDRs created and cross‐listed in the
three decades stretching from the 70s to the 90s. Not surprisingly, most of the growth in SDRs and cross
listings emerged after 1990. In terms of the numbers of SDRs created and cross‐listed either in
aggregate or dispersed over time, Asia took the lead followed by Europe and Latin America. The
numbers of SDRs and SDRs that were cross‐listed had increased by more than twofold going from the
1990s to the 2000s. Focusing on the growth pattern in Asia over this period, we see that the number of
SDRs from Asia increased from 304 in the 1990s to 628 in the 2000s. The numbers of SDRs that were
cross‐listed increased from 188 to 462 over the same period. Hence, approximately 62% and 74% of the
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SDRs were cross‐listed in the 1990s and the 2000s respectively. The numbers of cross‐listings had
increased by 146 percent over this period. Moreover, a significant proportion of the SDRs and cross
listings in Asia came from the emerging economies, in particular, China and India. The emerging
economies contributed 139 out of 304 SDRs in the 1990s and 341 out of 628 in the 2000s. In other
words, the number of SDRs from the emerging economies in Asia has increased from about 46 percent
in 1990s to 54 percent in the 2000s. Out of the 139 SDRs created in the 1990s, 99 came from China and
India alone. In 2000s, the number of SDRs from China and India increased to 319 out of a total of 341.
The number of cross‐listed SDRs from the emerging economies in Asia increased from 60 in 1990s to 242
in 2000s, a 300 percent increase. The number of cross‐listed SDRs from the emerging economies
expressed as a percentage of the total number of cross‐listed SDRs has increased from 32 percent to 54
percent. Again, China and India were the leading contributors to this growth; 225 out of the 242 SDRs
cross‐listed in 2000s were from China and India.
Similar growth patterns, perhaps not as pronounced, are observed for Europe and Latin America.
For Europe, 94 out of the 218 SDRs created in the 1990s and 257 out of the 529 SDRs created in 2000s
were from the emerging economies. The number of SDRs from the emerging economies has increased
by 173 percent going from the 1990s to the 2000s. The total number of cross‐listed SDRs from Europe
was 142 in 1990s and 365 in 2000s. The numbers of cross‐listed SDRs that originated from the emerging
European economies was 50 in the 1990s and it increased to 117 in the 2000s, a 134 percent growth.
The numbers of SDRs and cross‐listed SDRs from Latin America have increased by about 150 percent and
100 percent respectively going from the 1990s to the 2000s.

3. A New Strategic Role for Stock Exchanges
The evidence presented in Table 1 reveals that in the recent ten years there has been tremendous
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growth in the creation and listing of SDRs9. This presents significant listing opportunities for stock
exchanges in the United States as well as other developed countries. What is worth noting is that the
composition of the clientele has changed – a larger proportion of the firms that are seeking to list their
equity are now from the emerging economies. Unlike firms from the developed economies, firms from
the emerging economies are plagued with severe information asymmetries. This information
asymmetry problem is a product of various deficiencies in the emerging economies including lax
disclosure requirements, lack of experienced financial analysts to evaluate the firms, weak corporate
governance, weak legal protection for minority shareholders, and the absence of a market for corporate
control in terms of takeovers and leveraged buy outs so there is no mechanism available to discipline
the managers and align the managers’ interests with the investors. But firms from the emerging
economies can circumvent these deficiencies by cross‐listing their equity on an established exchange in
a developed economy.
Putting aside any consideration for costs, the United States possibly provides one of the best
solutions to the problems faced by the firms from the emerging economies. However, the solution
offered by the United States is less than perfect. Even though the United States is known to impose
stringent securities laws, Lictht (2001a,2001b, 2003) finds that in many cases the Security Exchange
Commission (SEC) takes a hand‐off approach and seldom enforce the laws on the foreign issuers.
Similarly Siegel (2005) finds that the SEC has not been responsive to violations by foreign issuers.
Looking back as far as 1933, the year when the first federal securities law was enacted, Siegel is only
able to find 25 instances of private legal actions against foreign firms10. If the SEC cannot adequately
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Although there was a dip in the creation of SDRs recently because of the financial crisis, it seems that the trend
has picked up again at least in the case of Asia. For Asia, the number of SDRs created has declined from a high of
97 in 2007 to 49 in 2008 but has subsequently increased to 67 in 2009. Over half of these SDRs are from the
emerging economies. For Europe, the number of SDRs created has declined from a high of 111 in 2007 to 97 in
2008 and then further declined to 38 in 2009. We think this is due to the continuing financial crisis in Europe which
may have affected the growth prospects of the firms that are considering cross‐listing their equity.
10
Coffee (2002) argues that this is due to the fact that many cases were settled out of court.
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address the information asymmetry problem, perhaps the other channels of controls—the investment
banks, rating agencies and financial analysts—can make up for SEC’s failings? Unfortunately investment
banks, ratings agencies and financial analysts (especially on the sell side) are handicapped by conflicts of
interests because they have a financial interest in offering favorable recommendations or ratings for
their clients as we have witnessed in the events that led to the current financial crisis. For this reason
their subjective opinions and advices will be taken with a big grain of salt. At best, they can only
partially resolve the information asymmetry problem between the corporate insiders and external
investors. Furthermore, it is typical that very few analysts will be assigned to cover the newly cross‐listed
firms and the assigned analysts will in all likelihood not be the most reputable ones in the industry.
Hence, there is a dearth of reliable quality information about these new firms from the emerging
economies.
The discussion above highlights the fact that there is room for someone to play the role of an
information and reputation intermediary. What we need is a reputable entity with the right motivation
and incentives to supply this information. An ideal candidate for this role is the stock exchange. Unlike
investment banks and rating agencies, stock exchanges derive their revenues from listing and trading
fees, so it is in their interests to list firms that will likely be successful in the long run. The interests of the
exchanges and investors are therefore aligned so the stock exchanges have the right incentives to
evaluate the listing firms objectively. Moreover, by serving as information intermediaries, reputable
exchanges provide a valuable service to firms from the emerging economies and are in a better position
to attract the listing business from the emerging economies. However, for stock exchanges to serve as
credible information intermediaries, they will need to do more than what they currently practice. They
will need to conduct due diligence on the listing firms beyond merely checking for compliance with their
listing requirements. Macey and O'Hara (2002) suggest looking beyond the size of listing firms and focus
on factors such as “business plans and prospects, integrity and quality of management, commitment to
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following sound, conservative accounting practices and good corporate governance." We will refer to
this expanded set of requirements as simply the “listing requirements" in our model.

4. The Game
The evidence presented in Section 2 shows that there is a growing number of companies from the
emerging economies, for instance China and India, which seek to list their shares in well developed and
established markets, particularly in the United States and Europe. We argue in Section 3 that the needs
of this clientele couple with the inadequacies of the existing legal and financial system create an
opportunity for a stock exchange to leverage their reputation to play the role of an information and
reputation intermediary. In this section, we develop a model to analyze the dynamic interaction
between an exchange playing the proposed role and firms seeking to list their equity on the exchange.
We assume there is a reputable stock exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange that self‐
imposes a minimum listing requirements. Any firm that is listed on an exchange must then meet this
level of requirements. The exchange lists foreign firms from emerging economies, such as China and
India, in addition to firms from the developed economies with known quality. Assume for simplicity that
there is one emerging economy. The true prospective values of firms in the emerging economy are
uncertain to investors and the stock exchange. However, they know the probability distribution of the
prospective values. For ease of exposition, in the rest of the paper we will refer to prospective value as
simply “value.” Further assume that all these firms are already listed in the local exchange in the
emerging economy.
Assume that the value of every firm, denoted by , is uniformly distributed along the unit
interval, i.e.

∈ 0,1 . We normalize the number of firms in the developing economy to unity and

assume it to be continuous for simplicity. The management of each firm tries to maximize the value of
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his firm, as perceived by investors, net of listing costs. We further assume that each firm has one share
to list in the reputable foreign exchange if it chooses to cross list.
Our game is a game of adverse selection similar to Akerlof ( 1970). It is a sequential game. First,
the stock exchange chooses its listing requirements,

∈ 0,1 . Second, firms choose whether to cross

list their stock by which they will have to comply with the foreign exchange's listing requirement, . It is
worth emphasizing that the listing requirements are chosen endogenously. The payoff functions are
defined as follows. The payoff function for the stock exchange is given by:
⁄

(1)

where and / are the revenue and cost functions for the exchange. An exchange derives its
revenues from two primary sources, a fixed listing fee and a trading fee that varies directly with the level
of the trading volume of the listed shares. Since trading volume varies in general with firm size and
trading fees have become a dominant source of revenues for exchanges, we express the revenue
where

function as

0 is a constant and

is the minimum firm value for firms that

choose to cross‐list on a foreign exchange for a given listing requirement, .
The cost function , / , is the cost borne by the exchange for managing the listed firms. We
assume that 0

1,

0, and

0. We have endogenized the reputational capital in the

proposed cost structure. An exchange, by setting a lower

will attract more firms but with lower

quality, so this will have a negative effect on its (marginal) cost for two reasons. First, as more
companies are listed, the marginal cost of listing should increase or remain unchanged. This is in
accordance with the non‐decreasing marginal cost of production which is typically assumed in firm
theory. The same rationale is expected to apply for an exchange. Second, lowering the listing
requirement will attract lower quality companies. Since the due diligence process will be more costly for
lower quality companies and these companies are more likely to affect the reputation of the exchange
11

adversely, increasing the listing of lower quality companies will increase the exchange’s marginal cost of
listing. In the rest of the paper we will assume that
constant and

is a quadratic function,

0 is a

, where

is the number of companies listed by the exchange.

A representative firm payoff function is given by:
⁄

|
where

1,0

(2)

| is the expected value of the firm conditional on being cross‐listed on the foreign exchange

1 or not being cross‐listed

0). Empirical evidence (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge,

Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004, 2009; and Hail and Leuz, 2005) shows that firms that choose to cross‐list their
equity in general have better growth opportunities but are unable to realize the full value of the growth
opportunities in their domestic markets because of information asymmetries between the corporate
insiders and the external investors, little or no access to capital to support the growth, and weak
corporate governance and protection for the minority shareholders. By listing their equity with a
reputable exchange in a developed economy, cross‐listing firms can enjoy various benefits including the
certification of their quality by a reputable exchange, easier access to capital at lower cost, better
corporate governance and better protection for minority shareholders. The second term,

⁄ is the

total cost to the firm for cross‐listing its shares. The total cost reflects the cost incurred by the firm to
comply with the exchange’s listing requirements. Since firm value appears in the denominator of the
cost function, the marginal cross‐listing cost is decreasing in the value of the firm. Our intent is to model
the observation that compliance is less costly for higher quality firms. This is in the same spirit as
Spence (1973), where he assumes that education is less costly for more productive workers.
5.

Analysis and Discussion
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This section investigates the behavior of the exchange and firms in a sub game perfect equilibrium.
The manager of a firm knows the true value of her firm. Given a listing requirement announced by the
exchange and the fact that listing is costly, there must exists a lower bound on the value of the firm
below which the manager will not be willing to cross list its share on the exchange. Consider a firm with
a true value . For this firm to be willing to cross list, the lower bound for the firm value should satisfy
⁄

0. That is, the manager would be willing to cross‐list on the exchange if the true value of

the firm is at least equal to . Even though investors do not know the true value of the firm, they are
aware of the lower bound face by the management. Thus, to the investors, the expected value of any
firm that cross lists on the reputable foreign stock exchange is equal to 1

/2. Similarly, the

expected value of a firm that chooses not to cross‐list on the exchange will be /2 . Hence, given the
listing requirement, , set by the stock exchange, a value maximizing firm will need to solve the
following:
max

/2

∈ ,

/

(3)

Since cross listing is costly, any firm that cross‐lists will choose to meet only the minimum level, , that is
imposed by the exchange. Consequently, a firm with value, , will be indifferent between cross‐listing or
not if its payoff satisfies 1

/2

/

/2. From this condition, we observe that firms that

choose to cross‐list must have a value, , of at least 2

. We also require 2

for all the listing

firms because the minimum value of the listing firm cannot be less than the listing requirement, .
There is an upper bound to the listing requirement; if

1/2, it will not be beneficial for any firm to

cross lists. Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, if 1/2

1/2, all firms with values

will cross‐list on the foreign reputable exchange while all firms with values
Otherwise none of the firms will choose to cross‐list.
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∈ 0, 2

∈ 2

,1

will not cross‐list.

Now consider the first stage of the game where the stock exchange chooses its listing
requirements. The reputable foreign stock exchange maximizes (1) subject to its market share defined
by Proposition 1, that is

max

/

where the minimum value of a listed firm,

, is 2

. From the first order condition of this maximization

problem we obtained
8
12

4

1

[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]

Figure 1 shows a plot of versus

for

∈ 0, 1⁄2 and

1. We see from the plot that as long as

is positive, will be positive. This is consistent with the assumptions made about and
the second order condition is met since

⁄

24

24

2 /

. Accordingly,

0. Hence, a

subgame perfect equilibrium exists as described in the proposition.
Although our model has over simplified the actual interaction between the exchange and listing
firms, our results are nonetheless consistent with the findings in the literature. In 2007, the Exchange
Act Rule 12h‐6, which is intended to simplify deregistration procedure, was adopted by the SEC.
Immediately following the adoption of this rule, there was an increase in deregistration activity in the
second‐half of 2007. Doige, Karolyi and Stulz (2009) look into the reasons for the deregistration and
conclude that the firms that chose to deregister do so because they have poor growth prospects going
14

forward and therefore have less need for external capital. In our model, the equilibrium level of listings
is affected by the distribution of firm value. When there is a change in the growth prospects for the
firms, this distribution will change and will cause the equilibrium level of listings to shift. We can
therefore interpret the increase in deregistration activity in the latter half of 2007 as a result of a
downward shift in the equilibrium level of listings that is triggered by a change in the underlying
distribution in firm value. Though there is only one exchange in our model, we can infer that if there are
multiple exchanges in our model, each with a distinct level of reputation capital, the equilibrium
outcome will be a segmented market where each exchange will choose to serve a particular segment of
the clienteles. Our model if extended to include multiple exchanges will neither result in “a race to the
bottom” where exchanges compete by continually lowering their listing standards or “a race to the top”
which is the reverse of the former outcome. Consider for instance the case where we have two
exchanges, one with a high reputation and the other a low reputation. In our set up, it will not make
sense for the lower reputation exchange to set a listing requirement that is equal or higher than that set
by the higher reputation exchange because firms that can meet the listing requirements of the high
reputation exchange will not choose to list their equity with the low reputation exchange. The rational
choice for the low reputation exchange is to set a lower listing requirement to attract those firms that
find listing on the higher reputation exchange unfeasible.
6. Conclusion
We provide current evidence to show that the numbers of sponsored depositary receipts created
and cross‐listed have increased by more than two‐fold over the last decade and a substantial proportion
of this growth came from the emerging and developing economies. This trend presents the stock
exchange industry with significant business opportunities. The firms from the emerging economies face
severe information asymmetries in the market and have a dire need for a credible entity to signal their
qualities. We argue that the SEC, investment banks, rating agencies, and financial analysts cannot fully
15

address the information asymmetry problem faced by these firms. Hence, there is room for someone to
play the role of an information and reputation intermediary. What we need is a reputable entity with
the right motivation and incentives to supply this information. We argue that an ideal candidate for this
role is the stock exchange because the incentive structure for an exchange motivates the exchange to
list firms that are likely to be successful in the long run. Accordingly, stock exchanges have the right
incentives to evaluate the listing firms objectively. Since the proposed role leverage on the exchange’s
reputational capital, reputable exchanges will be able to compete more effectively for the growing
listing business from the emerging economies. We contribute further by developing a parsimonious
model to analyze the interaction between an exchange playing the new role and firms seeking to list
their equity on the exchange. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained and provide an
explanation for the spike in delisting in the latter half of 2007. Our model fills an important gap by
addressing some shortcomings in existing theoretical models.
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Table 1. Growth Trend for Sponsored Depository Receipts and Cross‐listings
Geographic Region

1970‐89

1990‐99

2000‐10

Total

No. of SDRs
No. of cross‐listed SDRs

23
23

304
188

628
462

955
673

Asia (excluding IMF Advanced Economies)
No. of SDRs (China & India Only)
No. of cross‐listed SDRs (China & India Only)

0
0

139 (99)
60 (37)

341 (319)
242 (225)

480
302

No. of SDRs
No. of cross‐listed SDRs

9
9

218
142

529
365

756
516

Europe (excluding IMF Advanced Economies)
No. of SDRs
No. of cross‐listed SDRs

0
0

94
50

257
117

357
167

0
0

79
63

198
126

277
189

Asia

Europe

Latin America
No. of SDRs
No. of cross‐listed SDRs

(Source: Bank of New York Mellon’s Depositary Receipts directory as of May 11, 2010)
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Table 2. A List of Advanced Economies As Classified By the International Monetary Fund
Asia

Europe

Australia
Hong Kong SAR
Japan
Korea
New Zealand
Singapore
Taiwan

Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
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Figure 1. Plot of c versus θ (for f = 1)
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